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A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: THE 
CURRENT STATE OF THE VIDEO PRIVACY 
PROTECTION ACT FOR VIDEOS ON THE 
INTERNET AND THE NEED FOR UPDATED 
LEGISLATION 
Schooner Sonntag* 
In 2014, online streaming services overtook the traditional method of 
viewing television programs.1  Recent court decisions, however, extending 
the applicability of the Video Privacy and Protection Act (hereafter VPPA) 
to videos provided over the Internet have created unease in the current 
system of distributing online content.2  Originally drafted in 1988 and 
amended in 2012,3 the VPPA creates a private cause of action for 
“consumers” against “video tape service providers” that provide 
“personally identifiable information” to third parties.4  Yet, due to unclear 
definitions in the VPPA’s drafting, the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits 
have reach conflicting conclusions over Act’s reach in the online era and 
the reach of the terms “subscriber,” as a subset of “consumer,” and 
“personally identifiable information” in Yershov v. Gannett Satellite 
Network, Inc., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, and Ellis v. 
                                                          
* Thank you to my editors Professor Mary Dant, Ethan Bond, and Neda Hajian. 
 
1. See Todd Spangler, Streaming Overtakes Live TV Among Consumer Viewing 
Preferences: Study, VARIETY (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:21 AM), 
http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/streaming-overtakes-live-tv-among-consumer-viewing-
preferences-study-1201477318/. 
2. The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). 
3. The Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258 
(2013). 
4. The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2012). 
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Cartoon Network.5  This conflicting precedent threatens the common 
practice of online video providers trading viewer information in order to 
secure sufficient revenue. 
This Note outlines the history of the VPPA and argues that the VPPA 
in its current form is inadequate to cover the complexities of online video 
distribution.  After outlining and comparing the contrasting approaches by 
the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, this paper illustrates the underlying 
issues of the cases that cannot be properly addressed through the Supreme 
Court granting certiorari without causing further needless uncertainty.  
Finally, this Note describes the necessary considerations for the legislature 
to correctly balance consumer privacy with the economic realities of free 
online content and provide a suitable benchmark for online privacy. 
  
                                                          
5. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 2016); In re 
Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 15-1441, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11700 (3d Cir. June 
27, 2016); Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We recognize, even if only intuitively, that our data has to be going 
somewhere.  And indeed it does, feeding an entire system of trackers, 
cookies, and algorithms designed to capture and monetize the information 
we generate.  Most of the time, we never think about this.  We browse the 
Internet, and the data-collecting infrastructure of the digital world hums 
along quietly in the background. 
 –Judge Julio M. Fuentes6 
 
Every day, Americans use websites and online subscription services 
to view movies, television programs, and other videos. 7  There is no doubt 
that online access to video content has become the dominant method of 
video consumption in the United States.8  In 2014, online streaming 
services overtook the traditional method of viewing television programs 
with over forty-two percent of American households using video-streaming 
services9 and over fifty percent of households streaming movies and 
television programs on a monthly basis.10  In addition, people watch other 
videos online on free websites such as YouTube, which boasts 300 hours of 
new content uploaded each minute, 500 million videos viewed each day, 
and over a billion users worldwide.11  Simultaneously, mobile phones now 
account for over fifty percent of YouTube views.12 
Although this growth allows ideas and information to flow freely, the 
reality is that no online content is truly available for free: in exchange for 
                                                          
6. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2016). 
7. See Todd Spangler, Streaming Overtakes Live TV among Consumer Viewing 
Preferences: Study, VARIETY (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:21 AM), 
http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/streaming-overtakes-live-tv-among-consumer-viewing-
preferences-study [http://perma.cc/K5XZ-TF3A]. 
8. See id. 
9. Id. 
10. 56% of those surveyed stream movies and 53% stream television on a monthly basis.  
Id. 
11. Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html 
[http://perma.cc/5369-PVZH]. 
12. Id. 
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this content, viewers provide data about themselves and their habits.13  
Lurking behind the scenes of every webpage is a web of tracking software 
taking note of each visitor and compiling the raw data of each visit.14  Most 
Internet users know that websites supplying articles or videos to the public 
often monetize their content by selling related advertising space to third 
parties.15  However, advertisers also seek additional information through 
social media to target individuals for services based on their interests.16   
The obvious benefit to this practice is that advertisers can observe 
consumers’ habits online to create targeted advertising.17  This process 
compensates websites both for the information they gather behind the 
scenes and for the subsequent advertising opportunities they provide, thus 
enabling businesses to distribute online content for free.18  Furthermore, 
these advertisements are convenient for consumers, enabling them to 
efficiently find goods and services that they will enjoy.19  Subscription 
video services similarly track their users’ video habits while outwardly 
claiming these actions merely provide personalized services for 
customers.20 
                                                          
13. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 266. 
14. See id. 
15. Contextual advertising is one of the main strategies for monetizing a website, along 
with selling advertising space to affiliated sites.  See Vishnu, How Do Blogs and Websites Make 
Money Online? Monetize Your Blog for Maximum Revenue, COLORLIB. (Oct. 10, 2016), 
http://colorlib.com/wp/how-blogs-and-websites-make-money-online [http://perma.cc/CVW9-
UA8V]. 
16. Facebook tells businesses that its advertising tools provide “fine-tuned” marketing to 
help its clients find new customers using information provided by its users to target profiles it 
deems similar to those of consumers the business already has, along with particular interests and 
tendencies that align with the company’s desired market.  Choose Your Audience, FACEBOOK 
BUSINESS, http://www.facebook.com/business/products/ads/ad-targeting [http://perma.cc/4DYJ-
GW5K].   
17. Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION i, v (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-
transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/M5X5-7SWR]. 
18.  Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See Lara O’Reilly, Netflix Lifted the Lid on How the Algorithm that Recommends You 
Titles to Watch Actually Works, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 26, 2016, 8:53 AM), 
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In recent years, more sophisticated methods have emerged for 
collecting data, enabling “data brokers” to take full advantage of the wealth 
of information available from Internet usage.21  These companies create 
information profiles on consumers, using data collected from websites, 
users themselves, and public sources.22  Data brokers rarely have any direct 
contact with consumers but instead sell the information gathered to 
corporations or other data brokers.23  Nevertheless, the Federal Trade 
Commission expressed concern about the massive amounts of data stored 
regarding individuals and their habits.24  As of now, no federal legislation 
prohibits brokers from sharing this information with third parties unless the 
data is used for specific purposes such as credit, employment, insurance, or 
housing.25  Furthermore, consumers do not have a right to know what 
information has been gathered about them or to correct any inaccuracies in 
the data.26 
                                                          
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-netflix-recommendation-algorithm-works-2016-2 
[http://perma.cc/8448-2F97]. 
21. According to the FTC report, one such broker has roughly 3000 pieces of data on 
every American consumer.  Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, supra 
note 12, at iv. 
22. Id. at iv–v.  
23. See id. at iv. 
24. According to the FTC report, one such broker has roughly 3000 pieces of data on 
every American consumer.  Id. 
25. Most data brokers are not consumer reporting agencies under the Federal Credit 
Reporting Act and are not subject to its restrictions on consumer reports.  Data Brokers and 
“People Search” Sites, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/data-brokers-and-people-search-sites 
[http://perma.cc/H5KD-UMU4]. 
26. Some data brokers provide general statistics of what sorts of information have been 
collected on a specific user but do not provide what exact information has been gathered.  Steve 
Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, 60 MINUTES (Mar. 9, 2014), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-your-personal-information 
[http://perma.cc/CMJ9-3CEL].  Naturally, individuals are wary when it comes to the use of 
personal information and have expressed concern when such data driven marketing becomes very 
specific or seemingly inaccurate.  See Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured out a Teen Girl was 
Pregnant before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-
pregnant-before-her-father-did [http://perma.cc/PY4D-4F3E]. 
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However, recent federal appellate court decisions extending the 
applicability of the Video Privacy and Protection Act (“VPPA”)27 to videos 
provided over the Internet created unease in the current system of 
distributing online content.28  Originally drafted in 198829 and amended in 
2012,30 the VPPA creates a private cause of action for “consumers” against 
“video tape service providers” that provide “personally identifiable 
information” to third parties.31  Thus, the VPPA has become the sword for 
the recent outburst in class-action litigation against video providers by 
consumers concerned for their privacy.32   
Yet courts have recently disagreed about how the VPPA should apply 
to the modern age of Internet technology.33  In Ellis v. Cartoon Network, 
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a person who uses a smartphone to 
view free content without some form of commitment does not qualify as a 
“consumer” under the statute.34  However, the First Circuit reached an 
entirely different conclusion in Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Network, Inc., 
                                                          
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)–(f) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013). 
28. See generally Evan Wooten & Zachariah DeMeola, A New Chapter in Video Privacy 
Protection Act’s History, LAW360 (June 23, 2014, 10:40 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/550346/a-new-chapter-in-video-privacy-protection-act-s-history 
[http://perma.cc/LAV9-8KP8]. 
29. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 1 (1988). 
30. Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 
Stat. 2414 (2013). 
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (defining consumer as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of 
goods or services from a video tape service provider.”  A video tape service provider is “any 
person, engaged in the business in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce of rental, sale, or 
delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials . . . .” and personally 
identifiable information “includes information which identifies a person as having requested or 
obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.”). 
32. Christin S. McMeley & John D. Seiver, A Look at How Technology is Transforming 
the Application of the VPPA to Digital Media, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 2014), 
http://www.bna.com/look-technology-transforming-n17179921750 [http://perma.cc/8Q6Y-
HHS7]. 
33. See generally Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 
2016); In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 262; Ellis v. Cartoon Network, 
Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) (illustrating how courts have disagreed about the VPPA’s 
application to Internet technology). 
34. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1255–58. 
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ruling that downloading a free application for viewing of free content is 
sufficient to make an individual a “consumer” under the VPPA.35  The 
court also held that an Android device identification number and a GPS 
location together qualify as “personally identifiable information” under the 
VPPA even though the two pieces of information did not independently 
provide the identity of the user.36   
After the Yershov decision, the Third Circuit in In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Privacy Litigation reached the opposite conclusion, declaring 
that only information “that would readily permit an ordinary person to 
identify a specific individual’s video-watching behavior” can be considered 
personally identifiable information.37  Furthermore, the Third Circuit found 
that a child’s username, IP address, gender and birthdate, along with 
communications on a website, do not meet the criteria.38  In early 2017, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, thus refusing to resolve the 
conflict. 39  Such conflicting precedent does not permit a stable 
marketplace, as video providers cannot be certain what information they 
can give advertisers without exposure to litigation or even to whom they 
owe a duty of privacy. 
This Note argues that the VPPA in its current form is inadequate to 
cover the complexities of video distribution online and therefore creates 
needless ambiguity.  Further legislation is necessary to balance consumer 
privacy with the economic realities of free online content.  Part II of this 
Note discusses the history of the Video Privacy Protection Act, its statutory 
structure, the terms under debate, and the 2012 amendment pertaining to 
online video.  Part III outlines the contradictory approaches of the First, 
Third, and Eleventh Circuits in applying the VPPA.  Part IV discusses the 
fundamental differences in these approaches, examines the underlying 
                                                          
35. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 484, 48790. 
36. Id. at 486. 
37. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 267. 
38. Id. at 287 n.163, 287–88. 
39. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 266, cert. denied sub nom. C. 
A. F. v. Viacom Inc., 137 S. Ct. 624 (2017) (mem.); see also Julie Shepard, Emily Bruemmer & 
Andrew Noll, Supreme Court Declines to Weigh in on What Constitutes “Personally Identifiable 
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issues, and outlines the need for legislative action to resolve these issues.  
Part V outlines the considerations Congress should take in drafting new 
legislation that protects both personal privacy and e-commerce.  Part VI 
explores the possibility that proper online video legislation can pave the 
way for future additional legislation regarding even broader personal 
privacy on the Internet.   
II. THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 
[I]t is the role of the legislature to define, expand, and give meaning 
to the concept of privacy.  This bill will give specific meaning to the right 
of privacy, as it affects individuals in their daily lives. 
 –Senator Chuck Grassley40 
A. Judge Bork & the Birth of the VPPA 
The roots of the VPPA lie in the age of the brick-and-mortar video-
rental store.41  In 1987, the Washington City Paper published an article 
containing a list of 146 films rented by then Supreme Court nominee 
Robert Bork and his family.42  The paper acquired and published this list 
without Bork’s permission and it concluded its article by expressing 
interest in the viewing history of other public officials.43  Congress viewed 
this publication as a serious breach of personal privacy akin to a real life 
version of “Big Brother” monitoring individuals’ activities.44  Congress 
quickly took action as both the Senate and the House of Representatives 
concurrently drafted legislation to address the impropriety.45  In a joint 
                                                          
40. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 6 (1988). 
41. See id. 
42. Id. at 5. 
43. Id.; see Christin S. McMeley & John D. Seiver, A Look at How Technology is 
Transforming the Application of the VPPA to Digital Media, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 2014), 
http://www.bna.com/look-technology-transforming-n17179921750 [http://perma.cc/8Q6Y-
HHS7] (discussing politicians such as Senator Bob Dole, Senator Joe Biden, and Senator Ted 
Kennedy). 
44. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 6. 
45. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 284 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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session, both bodies passed the VPPA by voice vote.46  President Reagan 
signed the VPPA into law on November 5, 1988.47   
According to the Senate’s Judiciary Committee Report, the Act’s 
stated purpose was “[t]o preserve personal privacy with respect to the 
rental, purchase or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual 
materials.”48  Representative Al McCandless, the sponsor of the original 
House bill, tied the right of privacy in this instance to personal growth and 
free speech.49  According to Representative McCandless, the public has the 
right to “quiet” and “reflection” in pursuing the “intellectual vitamins that 
fuel the growth of thought.”50  To this same end, early drafts of the 
legislation also endeavored to place similar limitations on the disclosure of 
library records.51  Overall, the Senate Judiciary Committee considered the 
VPPA the next logical step in a long line of privacy statutes starting in the 
1970s52 and the immediate successor to the Cable Communications Policy 
Act of 1984 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.53 
B. The VPPA: Structure and Terms 
Paragraph (b)(1) of the VPPA states that “[a] video tape [sic] service 
provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable 
information concerning any consumer of such provider shall be liable to the 
aggrieved person . . . .”54  The Act also specifies several exceptions.55  A 
                                                          
46. William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 23 (2013). 
47. Id. at 23 n.37. 
48. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 1. 
49. Id. at 7. 
50. It is not clear if Representative McCandless also believes that cat videos amount to an 
“intellectual vitamin,” but here we are.  See id. 
51. The committee ran into issues of application in the context of enforcement and left the 
protection of library records unresolved.  See id. at 8. 
52. Id. at 2–4. 
53. The VPPA is also similar in structure to these two acts, which will be discussed in 
section II.B.  47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (effective Oct. 26, 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012) 
(effective Nov. 2, 2002). 
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). 
SCHOONER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2017  4:14 PM 
280 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
video service provider is not liable when it discloses such information to 
the consumer himself,56 discloses such information to any other person 
pursuant to the consumer’s informed written consent57 or to a warrant or 
court order,58 discloses the name and address of the consumer (but not the 
title or subject matter of the video) where the consumer had ample 
opportunity to prevent the disclosure,59 or discloses such information in the 
provider’s “ordinary course of business.”60  In addition, the statute requires 
that video service providers destroy personally identifiable information 
within one year unless an action or order is pending.61  Moreover, the 
VPPA prohibits using personally identifiable information as evidence if it 
was not obtained in compliance with the Act.62  Finally, the VPPA 
expressly preempts directly conflicting state laws.63 
Structurally, the VPPA is very similar to both the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984 and the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986.64  The VPPA contains damages provisions that are 
nearly identical in structure to both Acts.65  Furthermore, the VPPA and the 
                                                          
55. Id. § 2710(b)(2). 
56. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(A). 
57. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B). 
58. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(C), (b)(2)(F). 
59. Subject matter may be disclosed if the sole purpose of the disclosure is for direct 
marketing of goods and services.  18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D), (b)(2)(D)(ii). 
60. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(E). 
61. Id. § 2710(e). 
62. Id. § 2710(d). 
63. Id. § 2710(f).  Additionally, courts have found that the Act does not preempt local 
rules requiring that there be no doors on private viewing booths.  Kathryn E. Copeland, 
Construction and Application of Federal Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710, 73 
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, 2 (2013). 
64. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (effective Oct. 26, 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2510 
(illustrating the structural similarities in the Acts). 
65. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (“(A) actual damages but not less than liquidated 
damages in an amount of $2,500; (B) punitive damages; (C) reasonable attorneys’ fees and other 
litigation costs reasonably incurred; and (D) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the 
court determines to be appropriate.”), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(f) (“(A) actual damages but not less 
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Cable Communications Policy Act both center on the terms “personally 
identifiable information” and “subscriber.”66  Finally, both the VPPA and 
the Cable Communications Policy Act require the timely destruction of 
personally identifiable information67 and both expect similarly permitted 
disclosures.68  Nonetheless, the VPPA includes damages terms that are 
much more favorable to plaintiffs than similar terms in the other two acts,69 
thereby providing consumers with more incentive to bring private actions. 
The VPPA’s definition of a “video tape service provider” 
encompasses a broad range of potential defendants.70  Under the Act, 
“video tape service provider” comprises “any person, engaged in the 
business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or 
delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual 
materials . . . .”71  This definition also includes “any person or other entity” 
                                                          
than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1000, 
whichever is higher; (B) punitive damages; and (C) reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation 
costs reasonably incurred), and 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (“(A) . . . the greater of the sum of actual 
damages . . . or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500.  (B) . . . the 
greater of the sum of actual damages . . . or statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more 
than $1000.”). 
66. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (pertaining to video tape service providers and 
disclosure of a subscriber’s personally identifiable information), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(a), (a)(2) 
(pertaining to cable operators and disclosure of a subscriber’s personally identifiable 
information). 
67. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (pertaining to video tape service providers and timely 
destruction of personally identifiable information), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (pertaining to cable 
operators and timely destruction of personally identifiable information). 
68. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2) (explaining permitted disclosures of personally 
identifiable information by video tape service providers), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(c), (d), (h) 
(explaining permitted disclosures of personally identifiable information by cable operators). 
69. The VPPA minimum damages award is $2,500 as opposed to $1,000 under the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and $500 under the Cable Communications Policy Act.  
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (“(A) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages in an 
amount of $2,500 . . .”), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2) (“(A) actual damages but not less than 
liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1000, 
whichever is higher . . .”), and 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (c)(1) (“(A) . . . the greater of the sum of actual 
damages . . . or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500.  (B) . . . the 
greater of the sum of actual damages . . . or statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more 
than $1000 . . .”). 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4). 
71. Id. 
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to whom a disclosure is made in a narrowly limited “usual course of 
business” or in special circumstances.72  Finally, subsection (c) states that 
the aggrieved party has a private cause of action against any person found 
“in violation” of the Act.73 
The Act defines a “consumer” as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber 
of goods or services from a video tape service provider.”74  While the terms 
“renter” and “purchaser” are abundantly clear in requiring some sort of 
commercial transaction, the term “subscriber” does not specify what kind 
of relationship is necessary to establish a subscription.75  Thus, the full 
definition of “consumer,” describing the appropriate class of plaintiffs, is a 
key subject of debate in courts.76 
“Personally identifiable information,” as defined in the VPPA, 
“includes information which identifies a person as having requested or 
obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service 
provider.”77  In the Senate Committee Report, Representative Kastenmeier 
notes that subparagraph (a)(3) consciously uses the word “include” to 
“establish a minimum, but not exclusive, definition of personally 
identifiable information.”78  Indeed, according to the report, the Senate 
intended the definition of “personally identifiable information” to 
encompass any information that links the customer or patron to particular 
materials or services,79 thereby allowing consumers to “maintain control” 
                                                          
72. Id. 
73. Id. § 2710(c). 
74. Id. § 2710(a)(1). 
75. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 487–90 (1st Cir. 
2016); see also Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1255–58 (11th Cir. 2015). 
76. See generally Yershov, 820 F.3d 482.  See also Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1255. 
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3). 
78. The Representative’s opinion appears in the Senate report as the Senate and House 
drafted bills concurrently and held a joint meeting to discuss.  The meeting determined that the 
Senate bill would continue forward.  S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 12 (1988).  See generally Video and 
Library Protection Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4947 and S. 2361 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the 
Subcomm. on Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1988). 
79. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 12. 
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of their personal identities.80  The report also declared the term was 
intended to be “transaction-oriented” and limited the scope of “video” in 
the bill to restrict the covered transactions to “the sale or rental of 
videotapes” and not other business transacted by the provider.81 
The damages provision of the VPPA also helps explain the Act’s 
recent popularity in class-action litigation.82  A successful plaintiff is 
entitled to liquidated damages of $2,500 or actual damages, whichever is 
greater.83  Additionally, the plaintiff can receive punitive damages, 
reasonable attorney’s fees, and other equitable relief “as the court 
determines to be appropriate.”84  Combined with the broad definition of 
possible defendants discussed above, this promise of significant damages 
under the VPPA is quite attractive to potential class-action litigants. 
C. The Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012 
In July of 2011, Representative Robert Goodlatte introduced to the 
House a proposed amendment to the VPPA to allow video tape service 
providers to obtain consent either at the time of a disclosure or “in advance 
for a set period of time” and by means of online election.85  Supporters saw 
the amendment merely as updating the outdated VPPA86 by allowing 
consumers to consent to disclosures of their information while viewing 
videos online. 87  But providers of online videos, such as Netflix, wanted to 
encourage users to share their movie and television preferences directly to 
social media through a simple, one-time click to avoid future litigation. 88  
                                                          
80. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 8. 
81. Id. at 12. 
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c); McMeley & Seiver, supra note 38. 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)(A). 
84. Id. § 2710(c)(2)(B)–(D). 
85. Video Privacy Protection Act, EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/vppa/#2011 
[http://perma.cc/A5CT-ZRB5]. 
86. 158 CONG. REC. H6851 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2012). 
87. Id.; McMeley & Seiver, supra note 38. 
88. Netflix helped sponsor the original bill following a call to shareholders in 2011.  
Video Privacy Protection Act, supra note 80; Joe Mullin, Congress Tweaks US Video-Privacy 
Law so Netflix Can Get on Facebook, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2012, 11:41 AM), 
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Indeed, the amendment became widely known as a “Netflix-backed 
amendment.”89   
Although Representative Goodlatte’s proposed changes passed the 
House overwhelmingly by a vote of 303 for and 116 against,90 the Senate 
returned the initial draft with further expansion to allow greater consumer 
flexibility in sharing their video sharing habits.91  The final amendment 
replaced the previous language of subparagraph (B), which had created an 
exception for “any person with the informed, written consent of the 
consumer given at the time the disclosure is sought.”92  The new language 
instead created a blanket license for videotape service providers lasting up 
to two years provided there was written consent via any means and the 
consumer’s right to withdraw consent at any time.93  President Obama 
signed the amendment into law in 2013.94  Interestingly, the 2012 
amendment process attempted no other alterations to the VPPA95 despite 
lawmakers recognizing that the changes failed to address the digital issues 
lurking on the horizon.96 
                                                          
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/12/congress-tweaks-us-video-privacy-law-so-netflix-can-
get-on-facebook [http://perma.cc/V8KR-FQPJ]. 
89. Netflix helped sponsor the original bill following a call to shareholders in 2011.  
Video Privacy Protection Act, supra note 80; Mullin, supra note 83. 
90. 158 CONG. REC. H6851. 
91. Id. 
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013). 
93. Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 
Stat. 2414 (2013). 
94. McMeley & Seiver, supra note 38. 
95. See Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act § 2. 
96. 158 CONG. REC. H6851 (“[M]y concerns are not so much about what’s in this bill as 
much as they are concerns about what is not in the bill.  So I’m agreeing not to allow the perfect 
to be the enemy of the good.”). 
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III. CURRENT ANALYSIS: FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS & 
SPLIT 
The statute is not well drafted, even after the error in section (b)(1) is 
corrected.  
 –Judge Richard Posner97 
 
The VPPA lay dormant for nearly eight years after its passage and the 
first case under the Act did not occur until 1996.98  Early cases primarily 
involved police obtaining video records, including pornography, during 
investigations.99  Because there were markedly few VPPA cases during the 
age of physical media,100 there were few opportunities for courts to address 
the VPPA’s numerous ambiguities.  More recently, however, both the 
Third and Seventh Circuits have politely noted that the VPPA is far from a 
perfect document.101 
A. In Re Hulu Privacy Litigation Opens the Floodgates 
In 2012, the Northern District in California first applied the VPPA to 
providers of videos over the Internet.102  In In re Hulu Privacy Litigation, a 
class of plaintiffs contended that Hulu wrongfully shared their personally 
identifiable information with various “online ad networks, metrics 
                                                          
97. Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2012). 
98. See Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 235, 238 (D.N.J. 1996). 
99. Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that officers violated the VPPA when obtaining individuals’ names and addresses without a 
subpoena or court order in order to ask they hand over a film deemed to be child pornography); 
Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at 240 (holding that an officer’s video records including pornography were 
protected and could not be used in a disciplinary action without a warrant, subpoena, or court 
order); see Kathryn Elizabeth McCabe, Note, Just You and Me and Netflix Makes Three: 
Implications for Allowing “Frictionless Sharing” of Personally Identifiable Information under 
the Video Privacy Protection Act, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 413, 428–29 (2013). 
100. Evan Wooten & Zachariah DeMeola, A New Chapter in Video Privacy Protection 
Act’s History, LAW360 (June 23, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/550346/a-
new-chapter-in-video-privacy-protection-act-s-history [http://perma.cc/LAV9-8KP8]. 
101. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 284 (3d Cir. 2016); Sterk, 
672 F.3d at 538. 
102. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 WL 3282960, at *23–24 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 10, 2012). 
SCHOONER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2017  4:14 PM 
286 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
companies (meaning, companies that track data), and social networks,” 
including comScore and Facebook.103  In opposition, Hulu filed for 
dismissal and claimed that plaintiffs could not have a valid claim under the 
VPPA because, among other reasons, Hulu was not a “video service 
provider” and plaintiffs were not “consumers” under the Act.104 
The district court rejected Hulu’s arguments for dismissal.  The court 
found that Hulu was a “video service provider,” stating that the VPPA 
included Hulu’s streamed videos under other “similar audiovisual 
materials.”105  In concluding that the medium of distribution did not limit 
the protection of video records, the court cited the 2001 Oxford English 
Dictionary, which included online formats in its definition of “material,” as 
well as the Senate Judiciary Committee Report’s general attitude regarding 
the necessity for privacy. 106 
The court was less clear about who a “subscriber” is under the 
VPPA.107  The court stated that a “subscriber” need not be a paying 
subscriber.108  Although the opinion mentions that Hulu tracked and shared 
information regardless of whether the individual was registered or logged 
in,109 it does not clarify whether a “subscriber” must be at least a registered 
user.110  Instead, the court required only that the plaintiffs be “more than 
just visiting” the website to survive the motion.111 
In 2014, the same court had the opportunity to set the threshold for 
personally identifiable information when Hulu moved for summary 
                                                          
103. Id. at *2. 
104. Hulu also argued that its disclosures were under the ordinary course of business but 
the court quickly dismissed this argument as Hulu’s activities were not among the explicit 
exceptions listed in the VPPA.  Id. at *12. 
105. Id. at *19. 
106. The court listed several of the Senate Report’s statements regarding privacy that are 
included in the discussion above.  Id. at *17. 
107. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2012 WL 3282960, at *22–24. 
108. Id. at *24. 
109. Id. at *7. 
110. Id. at *22–24. 
111. Id. at *23–24. 
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judgment based on the argument that no such information under the Act 
had been disclosed.112  In analyzing the Act’s statutory history, the court 
decided that personally identifiable information “identifies a specific 
person and ties that person to particular videos that the person watched.”113  
Thus, to this court, digital identifiers alone do not qualify as personally 
identifiable information, even if they could identify an individual when 
combined with other information disclosed to third parties.  However, this 
standard is not absolute and as the court noted, “context could render it not 
anonymous and the equivalent of the identification of a specific person.”114 
The court then applied this analysis to the different types of 
disclosures Hulu made to comScore and to Facebook.115  With regards to 
comScore, Hulu disclosed an individual’s Hulu ID, the video watched, and 
a cookie that comScore used to track users’ interactions with websites in 
which comScore was also interested.116  Although theoretically comScore 
could link the Hulu ID number to the specific Hulu ID, which includes the 
individual’s name used to register for the site,117 the court decided that this 
was insufficient to establish “personally identifiable information” under the 
VPPA since there was no evidence that anyone did in fact link “a specific, 
identified person and his video habits.”118  Further, the court decided that 
the tracking cookie implemented by Hulu also was not pernicious as it 
merely identified “someone’s consumption relevant to an advertiser’s 
desire to target ads to them.”119 
   However, the court found a triable issue of fact as to whether Hulu’s 
disclosures to Facebook violated the VPPA.120  When a viewer loaded a 
                                                          
112. Hulu also argued consent, but the law discussed in this case is prior to the 2012 
amendment and so is not relevant.  See generally In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 
2014 WL 1724344 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014). 
113. Id. at *28. 
114. Id. at *36. 
115. Id. at *28. 
116. Id. at *28–29. 
117. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2014 WL 1724344, at *39. 
118. Id. at *40. 
119. Id. at *41. 
120. Id. at *55. 
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video on Facebook, a Facebook “Like” button loaded on the page, which in 
turn sent Facebook the name of the video and a cookie through its 
programming.121  Overall, the court decided this interaction was markedly 
different from the comShare disclosure since the information could directly 
link an individual’s Hulu ID and Facebook account.122  As the Facebook 
account ID already includes the individual’s real name, the court 
determined that the above disclosure was not anonymous.123  Indeed, the 
court declared that Hulu’s disclosure to Facebook would violate the VPPA 
should there be clear evidence that the parties “negotiated the exchange of 
cookies so that Facebook could track information (including watched 
videos) about its users on Hulu’s platform when the Like button loaded, or 
if Hulu knew that it was transmitting Facebook ID cookies and video watch 
pages.”124  For this reason, the court was reluctant to grant summary 
judgment before it had completed a full analysis on the cookie.125 
This district court decision, because it supported the need for a court 
to look at the specific facts in each case, opened the floodgates for class-
action litigation under the VPPA against online video service providers.126  
Although the court attempted to distinguish online business from the 
personal disclosures the VPPA intended to prevent, it did not resolve 
ambiguities regarding the thresholds for “subscriber” and “personally 
identifiable information.”127   
 
 
                                                          
121. Id. at *44–45. 
122. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2014 WL 1724344, at *50. 
123. The court likened such a disclosure to throwing away confidential information into a 
bin that you knew was searched by the Washington Post.  See id. 
124. Id. at *55. 
125. Id. 
126. Wooten & DeMeola, supra note 95 (noting subsequent filings after the initial 
decision against ESPN, Cartoon Network, and the Wall Street Journal).  In 2014, further VPPA 
cases were filed against ESPN, CNN, Dow Jones, and the Walt Disney Company.  See generally 
Gregory M. Huffman, Note, Video-Streaming Records and the Video Privacy Protection Act: 
Broadening the Scope of Personally Identifiable Information to Include Unique Device Identifiers 
Disclosed with Video Titles, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 737 (2016). 
127. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2012 WL 3282960, at *13–19. 
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B. Ellis v. Cartoon Network: The Eleventh Circuit’s Narrow 
Approach to “Subscriber” 
The Eleventh Circuit endorsed a narrow definition of “subscriber,” 
deciding that individuals using a free application (or “app”) on their phone 
to watch a video do not qualify for protection under the VPAA.128  In Ellis 
v. Cartoon Network, Mark Ellis downloaded the free Cartoon Network app 
onto his Android phone to watch videos from the network.129  Using the 
app did not require logging in to view content.130  Cartoon Network then 
provided the Ellis’s Android ID number and the video title watched to 
“Bango,” a service that tracks consumer behavior across multiple platforms 
and links that information to a particular person.131 
The Eleventh Circuit noted that most dictionaries define “subscriber” 
as someone making some sort of payment.132  The court, however, 
concluded that payment is only one factor in determining whether someone 
is a subscriber, adopting the 1981 Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary definition of “subscriber” as “one that favors, aids, or supports 
(as by money contribution, moral influence, [or] personal 
membership).”133  In looking at other VPPA cases outside of the Eleventh 
Circuit, the court noted the discrepancy in judicial approaches to the 
interpretation of the word “subscribers” and elected instead to adopt a 
straightforward approach based on the “ordinary meaning” of the word 
“grounded” in the text of the Act.134  To accomplish this goal, the court 
pointed to the totality of factors involved in subscriptions including 
“payment, registration, commitment, delivery, [expressed association,] or 
access to restricted content.”135  Finally, the court justified its approach by 
                                                          
128. See generally Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015). 
129. Id. at 1254. 
130. Id. at 1253–54. 
131. Id. at 1254. 
132. Id. at 1256. 
133. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2278 
(Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 3d ed. 1966). 
134. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256; see Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 104 F. 
Supp. 3d 135, 146–47 (D. Mass. 2015). 
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emphasizing that Congress had not altered the VPPA definitions of 
“consumer” or “subscriber” during the 2012 amendment process.136   
Using this approach, the court determined that Ellis’s interaction with 
the Cartoon Network app did not qualify him as a “subscriber” under the 
VPPA.137  The court noted that Ellis had no “ongoing relationship” with 
Cartoon Network and that Ellis was “free to simply delete the app without 
consequences.”138  Additionally, Ellis did not have to provide any personal 
information to access the content.139  The court in this case agreed with the 
2012 analysis of the district court in In re Hulu Privacy Litigation that to be 
a subscriber, an individual must do more than visit a website and bookmark 
it for future use.140  In the instance before it, the court declared that Ellis did 
not establish an ongoing relationship because by accessing a free app for 
free content, he was essentially just bookmarking the site.141 
C. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network: The First Circuit’s 
Broad Interpretation of “Subscriber” & “Personally Identifiable 
Information” 
In April 2016, the First Circuit significantly broadened the definitions 
of “subscriber” and “personally identifiable information” under the 
VPPA.142  In Yershov, plaintiffs accessed video and other content through 
Gannet’s USA Today mobile app which in turn gave a third party, Adobe, 
information about the user including the title of the video, the phone’s GPS 
coordinates, and the phone’s unique Android ID.143 
                                                          
135. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256 (alteration in original) (quoting Yershov, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 
147). 
 136.  Id. at 1256–57. 
137. Id. at 1258. 
138. Id. at 1257. 
139. Id. 
140. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1257. 
141. Id. at 1258 (“[T]he free downloading of a mobile app on an Android device to watch 
free content, without more, does not a ‘subscriber’ make.”). 
142. See generally Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482 (1st 
Cir. 2016). 
143. Id. at 484–85. 
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The court analyzed whether Yershov qualified as a “subscriber” under 
the VPPA on the alleged facts.144  Like the court in Ellis, the court in 
Yershov consulted various dictionaries regarding the “plain meaning” of the 
term “subscriber”145 but ultimately adopted a multi-step approach and 
interpreted the term more broadly.146  In this instance, the First Circuit 
concluded that a subscriber is simply a person who “subscribes”; thus, it 
ignored other variations of the word and instead looked to definitions of the 
verb “subscribe.”147  In doing so, the court relied on updated definitions 
from The American Heritage Dictionary from 2000, which defined 
“subscribe” as “[t]o receive or be allowed to access electronic texts or 
services by subscription” and additionally defined “subscription” to include 
“[a]n agreement to receive or be given access to electronic texts or 
services.”148  In choosing this interpretation of “subscriber,” the First 
Circuit overturned the District Court’s decision, one that the Eleventh 
Circuit in Ellis had championed in its own approach.149   
Furthermore, the court openly deviated from the Eleventh Circuit’s 
approach in Ellis in the remainder of its analysis.150  The First Circuit first 
analogized the USA Today app to a service of convenience, akin to 
receiving a newspaper delivered to one’s doorstep.151  Indeed, the court 
found that by simply downloading the app, a user proclaimed intention of 
visiting the content more than once, thereby establishing a significant 
relationship.152  The court also reviewed the factors relied on in Ellis but 
commented that its own analysis balanced these factors “quite differently”: 
                                                          
144. Id. at 487. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 487–89. 
147. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487. 
148. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1726 (4th ed. 2000). 
149. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 488; Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
150. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489. 
151. Id. at 487. 
152. See id. 
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To use the App, Yershov did indeed have to provide Gannett with 
personal information, such as his Android ID and his mobile device’s GPS 
location at the time he viewed a video, each linked to his viewing 
selections.  While he paid no money, access was not free of a commitment 
to provide consideration in the form of that information, which was of 
value to Gannett.  And by installing the App on his phone, thereby 
establishing seamless access to an electronic version of USA Today, 
Yershov established a relationship with Gannett that is materially different 
from what would have been the case had USA Today simply remained one 
of millions of sites on the web that Yershov might have accessed through a 
web browser.153 
The court also distanced its decision from that in Ellis by concluding 
that the legislative inaction regarding the meaning of “subscriber” in the 
amendment indicated that the legislature intended courts to broadly 
interpret the term.154 
The First Circuit concluded that sharing a device’s Android ID and 
GPS coordinates qualify as sharing “personally identifiable information.”155  
Although the court admitted the VPPA’s definitions were “awkward,”156 it 
drew inspiration from the Act’s statement that “personally identifiable 
information” includes an individual’s name and address, thus stating that 
the category of information should be taken to encompass a broader range 
of data than just those listed.157  The court considered the hypothetical 
scenario where an individual views videos repeatedly from both home and 
work.158  In this scenario, the panel concluded that repeated views from 
these locations would reveal the identity of the individual in the same 
manner as handing over a name or address.159  Therefore, the First Circuit 
declared that Gannet should have been aware that Adobe had the “know 
                                                          
153. Id. at 489 (emphasis added). 
154. Id. at 488. 
155. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013)). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
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how” to link the addresses with a particular individual through data 
collection.160 
As the decision in Yershov merely allowed the case to survive a 
motion to dismiss, the court noted that its “actual holding, in the end, need 
not be quite as broad as [its] reasoning suggests.”161  However, the First 
Circuit’s reasoning has thrown the contentious arena of the VPPA into 
further chaos.162 
D. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation: The Third 
Circuit’s Interpretation of “Personally Identifiable Information” 
In June of 2016, yet another federal circuit court, the Third Circuit, 
faced the difficult task of addressing the limits of liability under the 
VPAA.163  In In re Nickelodeon, plaintiffs claimed that Viacom provided a 
third party, Google, with children’s “personally identifiable information” 
obtained when both parties installed their cookies on its Nickelodeon 
website.164  These cookies then collected, for advertising purposes, each 
child’s username, gender, birthdate, IP address, browser settings, unique 
device identifier, operating system, screen resolution, browser version, and 
web communications, including URL and video requests and cookie 
identifiers.165  Among other claims, plaintiffs brought an action under the 
VPAA against both Viacom and Google.166 
As the complaint listed Google as a defendant, the Third Circuit 
initially addressed the issue of third-party liability under the VPAA.167  
                                                          
160. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486. 
161. Id. at 489. 
162. See Joshua Jessen & Priyanka Rajagopalan, 1st Circ. Video Privacy Decision 
Creates Split with 11th Circ., LAW360 (May 13, 2016, 12:15 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/795073/1st-circ-video-privacy-decision-creates-split-with-11th-
circ [http://perma.cc/44BD-DCRL]. 
163. See generally In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262. 
164. Id. at 269. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 267. 
167. Id. at 279. 
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Here, the court determined that in receiving information from Viacom, 
Google’s position was akin to that of the reporter who released Judge 
Bork’s video records in 1987.168  Indeed, plaintiffs argued that the reporter 
who published Judge Bork’s records would have been subject to liability 
under the VPAA if it had existed then.169  However, the Third Circuit noted 
that the drafting of the VPPA was unclear regarding the declaration in 
subsection (c) that “a person found in violation” of the statute may be held 
liable.170  To resolve this ambiguity, the court reviewed decisions by the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits regarding the liability of third parties.171  Based 
on these decisions, the court decided that the VPPA merely prohibited the 
disclosure of “personally identifiable information” and not the collection of 
such information.172  Thus, Google was exempt from the claim.173 
Acknowledging that the VPPA was enacted before the widespread 
use of the Internet, the court followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
“instruction” that “[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal 
terms ambiguous, [a law] must be construed in light of [its] basic 
purpose.”174  Through this approach, the court decided that any reasoning 
that would find “any unique identifier” as “personally identifiable 
information” was far too broad175 since such reasoning contains no 
limitations and would force courts to presume the use of third party cookies 
on any website is illegal.176  The court also acknowledged that section 
                                                          
168. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 279–81. 
169. Id. at 279. 
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013); In re Nickelodeon Consumer 
Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 280. 
171. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 281 (reviewing Daniel v. 
Cantrell, 375 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2004) and Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535 
(7th Cir. 2012) to determine that the VPPA did not include liability for parties who received 
personally identifiable information). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 284 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975) (interpreting the Copyright Act)). 
175. Id. at 290. 
176. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 290. 
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(a)(3) of the VPPA could be interpreted to widen the scope of personally 
identifiable information, but determined that Congress’s intent at the time 
of the legislation was that this phrase would apply to other simple types of 
information that would identify a specific individual and not stretch to 
identifiers online.177 
Using the Supreme Court’s words as guidance, the Third Circuit 
found that personally identifiable information in the VPPA, as currently 
written, could only be information that with “little or no extra effort” would 
link individuals with their video records.178  The court bolstered its position 
by noting that Congress did not alter the language during the 2012 
amendment process to provide an updated definition despite receiving 
amicus briefs that raised the issue.179  Furthermore, the court distinguished 
Congress’s passing of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act to 
allow the Federal Trade Commission to issue regulations expanding the 
definition of “personal information” to include “persistent” identifiers that 
“over time” could reveal an individual’s identity. 180  Similarly, without a 
comparable legislative process, the court was unwilling to expand the 
meaning of “personally identifiable information.”181 
With regard to Viacom, the Third Circuit focused on Viacom’s 
disclosures of IP addresses, browser fingerprints, and device identifiers.182  
The court described these pieces of information as “static digital 
identifier[s]” that could not be directly linked to an individual without 
further information or considerable data-tracking.183  Indeed, the court 
noted that the process necessary to match an IP address to an individual 
person would require a subpoena in many cases.184  Thus, the court 
remarked that an outcome similar to Yershov would be appropriate only 
                                                          
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013); In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 286. 
178. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 284. 
179. Id. at 288–89. 
180. Id. at 287. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 281–82. 
183. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 283. 
184. Id. at 281 n.121. 
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where technology enabled receiving parties to enter an IP address in a 
search engine and reveal the identity of the individual with no further 
complications.185  Therefore, the court found that Viacom’s disclosures to 
Google practically identifying individuals was “too hypothetical” to qualify 
as “personally identifiable information.”186 
IV. IMPACT OF THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT & THE SUPREME COURT’S 
INABILITY TO EFFICIENTLY RESOLVE THE ISSUES 
[W]e do not think that a law from 1988 can be fairly read to 
incorporate such a contemporary understanding of Internet privacy. 
 –Judge Julio M. Fuentes187 
The Third Circuit correctly noted that the current crisis of the VPPA 
revolves around the common law’s inability to keep up with rapid changes 
in technology.188  While no case explicitly declares a split among the 
federal circuit courts, the circuits’ approaches are too irreconcilable to 
predict future cases brought under the current VPPA.  Furthermore, as this 
section will explain, even if the Supreme Court had taken a stance on the 
circuit splits, a Supreme Court decision regarding “subscribership” and 
“personally identifiable information” would not adequately resolve the 
underlying issues at hand.  Thus, only Congressional action will be 
sufficient to prevent future complications by providing Internet businesses 
with a reliable guideline. 
A. “Subscriber”: The Battle of the Dictionaries; 2012 Amendment 
As currently constructed, the VPPA’s failure to define “subscriber” 
leaves courts the opportunity to manipulate the term to their own ends.  In 
addressing the VPPA’s failure to define “subscribership,” the First Circuit 
in Yershov circumnavigated the common definition of the term 
“subscriber” and instead looked to define the related words “subscribe” and 
“subscription.”189  The First Circuit has faced valid criticism for avoiding 
                                                          
185. Id. at 290 n.177. 
186.  Id. at 290. 
187. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 290 (3d Cir. 2016). 
188. Id. 
189. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 2016). 
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any citation to pre-1988 dictionaries to support its final conclusion 
regarding legislative intent.190  On the other hand, the finding in Ellis 
requires much more comprehensive contact and sharing of personal 
information and uses definitions as understood at the time by utilizing the 
1981 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.191  In this regard, the 
Ellis approach seems to more accurately represent Congress’s intent. 
Yet, as illustrated by the Yershov court’s application of the Ellis 
court’s analysis in other respects, basing decisions on a finding of a 
“relationship” still leaves ample room for courts to dictate the outcome 
based on their own policy preferences.192  Indeed, this split is dangerous for 
online video providers as those providers who distribute videos through 
apps are currently at the mercy of a court’s choice of dictionary.  
Furthermore, under the Yershov decision, a trade of any information is 
sufficient to form a relationship between the parties,193 leaving video 
providers potentially included under the VPPA should a court deem that the 
user intended to form a relationship with the video provider. 
The courts in Ellis and Yershov also reached different conclusions 
about Congress’s purpose in failing to define the term “subscriber” during 
the 2012 amendment process.194  To understand this disagreement, it is 
important to note the impetus for the amendment and what it changed.  As 
noted above, the press described the 2012 amendment to the VPPA as a 
“Netflix-Backed Amendment.”195  Indeed, this fact alone explains the 
legislature’s priorities in making the changes.  Since Netflix users pay for 
                                                          
190. Joshua Jessen & Priyanka Rajagopalan, 1st Circ. Video Privacy Decision Creates 
Split with 11th Circ., LAW360 (May 13, 2016, 12:15 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/795073/1st-circ-video-privacy-decision-creates-split-with-11th-
circ [http://perma.cc/44BD-DCRL]. 
191. See Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). 
192. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489. 
193. See id. 
194. Compare Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256–57 (indicating that Congress did not want the term 
to be broadly defined), with Yershov, 820 F.3d at 488 (indicating that Congress did not want the 
term to be narrowly defined). 
195. See Video Privacy Protection Act, EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/vppa/#2011 
[http://perma.cc/A5CT-ZRB5]; Joe Mullin, Congress Tweaks US Video-Privacy Law so Netflix 
Can Get on Facebook, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2012, 11:41 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/12/congress-tweaks-us-video-privacy-law-so-netflix-can-get-on-facebook 
[http://perma.cc/V8KR-FQPJ]. 
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access to the company’s video library, they would qualify as “subscribers” 
under either a broad or a narrow interpretation of the term.196  Therefore, 
any legislation sought by Netflix would necessarily have no interest in 
addressing this definition.  Thus, it is clear why the 2012 amendment 
process provided no clarification on the scope of “subscriber” under the 
VPPA. 
B. “Personally Identifiable Information”: Disagreement over a Static 
versus Evolving Definition 
The differences between the First and Third Circuit’s interpretation of 
“personally identifiable information” under the VPAA stem from a 
fundamental disagreement over whether the term should remain static with 
a 1980s definition or evolve with changing technology.197  In Yershov, the 
First Circuit argued for a broad interpretation, relying on the original 
Congressional intent to protect more than just an individual’s name as 
“personally identifiable information.”198  Yet the logic in extending what 
types of information may be “personally identifiable” creates a possible 
slippery slope of liability that places the onus on the private viewer who 
may not know a conglomerate has the ability to discern an individual’s 
identity from collected data.  Conversely, in In re Nickelodeon, the Third 
Circuit argued that the 2012 amendment did not update the definition of the 
term in accordance with the trend of other legislation.199  Therefore, the 
court reasoned that the definition of “personally identifiable information” 
should remain static despite the threat of data amalgamation in the 
future.200 
Indeed, the use of “personally identifiable information” in the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (“CCPA”) supports such a static 
interpretation of the term.201  Curiously, the CCPA only negatively defines 
                                                          
196. Choose the Plan That’s Right for You, NETFLIX, 
http://www.netflix.com/getstarted?locale=en-IN [http://perma.cc/TC7X-Y9EB]. 
197. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 290 (3d Cir. 2016). 
198. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486. 
199. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 284. 
200. Id. at 290. 
201. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (effective Oct. 26, 2001). 
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the term through an amendment in 1992, stating that the term “does not 
include any record of aggregate data which does not identify particular 
persons.”202  This revision suggests that the original intention of the CCPA 
possibly included impersonal aggregated data.  However, even including 
the amendment to the CCPA, courts have taken a narrow interpretation of 
the original definition of “personally identifiable information.”203  As the 
Tenth Circuit observed in a footnote in Scofield v. Telecable of Overland 
Park, Inc., the legislative history of the CCPA indicates that the term was 
meant to apply only to “specific information about the subscriber” or the 
name and address of the individual on a list.204 
C. Inability of the U.S. Supreme Court to Adequately Resolve the 
Issues 
A Supreme Court decision interpreting the breadth of subscribership 
under the VPPA could have decisively signaled whether the Act applies 
only to the online equivalents of membership to video stores or whether it 
applies beyond this scope to an individual’s interaction with any video 
distributor online.  If the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the 
Eleventh Circuit in Ellis and narrowed the definition to the sharing of 
personal information and comprehensive contact, it would give video 
providers a general idea of what their boundaries are.  However, if the 
Supreme Court instead broadened the definition of “subscriber,” thereby 
broadening subscribership to free, downloadable apps, it would create 
considerable economic waste.  Companies would err on the side of caution 
and incur expense in developing compliant, but perhaps less efficient, 
practices.  Indeed, such a broad interpretation would not hinder data 
collection, but only deter video providers from using the convenient app 
format for video distribution.  To draw on the newspaper delivery analogy 
used in Yershov,205 if a doorstep is too far, the company will not toss a 
newspaper but leave it on the public street instead.  In either case, the 
Supreme Court would need to define precisely the relationship necessary to 
establish subscribership, which it is currently unwilling or unable to do.   
                                                          
202. Id. § 551(a)(2). 
203. Scofield v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., 973 F.2d 874, 876 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992); 
see also United States v. Cox Cable Commc’ns, No. 98CV118/RV, 1998 WL 656574, at *1 n.4 
(N.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 1998). 
204. Scofield, 973 F.2d at 876 n.2. 
205. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d at 487. 
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Additionally, if the Supreme Court were to broaden the interpretation 
of “subscriber” under the VPPA to cover free app users, it may prove to be 
insufficient to cause the desired change in online activity.  Indeed, why 
should the title of a video on the USA Today app be treated differently 
from other content on an app, such as the title of the article, or simply the 
fact that an individual has downloaded the app to a device?  In the age of 
brick-and-mortar video stores, the video’s title or description was the chief 
content that would tie an individual to certain interests and entertainment 
preferences.206  Today, a video may be only one of many pieces of media 
on a page that would provide that same information about an individual.207   
Indeed, members of Congress showed a similar thought process in 
their desire to include library records in early drafts of the Act—all 
information identifying “intellectual vitamins” must be protected 
equally.208  Although library records were separated from video records in 
the original drafting of the Act due to complications in enforcement against 
different providers,209 it should not be difficult to enforce the sharing of 
video titles and web page titles through an electronic medium by the same 
provider.  But, a broad interpretation of subscribership by the Supreme 
Court to include such apps would be fruitless without systematic change as 
the same data would simply be acquired elsewhere.   
With regard to “personally identifiable information,” both the First 
Circuit in Yershov and the Third Circuit in In re Nickelodeon addressed the 
real concern underlying the debate: data brokers’ ability to unmask the 
identities of individuals via their disclosures through accessing web 
pages.210  In the end, this fear of “Big Brother” is not about individuals 
sharing small pieces of anonymous information in a single transaction but 
instead about the possibility of these Internet companies gathering 
information from Internet use to target specific individuals.211  For 
                                                          
206. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 13 (1988). 
207. Most news stories include both video and text addressing an issue.  See, e.g., US 
Visa-Free Residency for Cubans Ends, BBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38605338 [http://perma.cc/WA73-MJDV]. 
208. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 7–8. 
209. Id. at 8. 
210. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486; see also In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 
827 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2016).   
211. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 268. 
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individuals to properly combat the possibility of being unmasked online, 
they would need extensive knowledge of the processes through which the 
information is currently gathered and connected as well as any new 
methods through which information will be gathered in the future.  Any 
Supreme Court decision would only be binding as to the facts of the case 
before the court and so would not provide individuals this protection.  
Without legislative intervention, courts will continue to struggle in creating 
a standard for privacy through the time-consuming process of litigation. 
Additionally, any Supreme Court interpretation of the VPPA terms’ 
application to online schemes would need to consider the motivations of 
plaintiffs seeking protection under the VPPA: either a desire to gain access 
to the favorable damage provisions of the VPPA, a desire to assert a right 
to privacy and a lack of reasonable alternatives, or a combination of the 
two.  For the Supreme Court to discern which scenario it is facing, it would 
need to undertake an exhaustive overview of current privacy law to find 
potential alternatives available to plaintiffs.  If it were to find sufficient 
alternatives, the Supreme Court may side with the logic outlined in In re 
Nickelodeon and agree that the Act is meant only to protect a certain subset 
of individuals not protected at all by other privacy statutes.212  Accordingly, 
the Court would have barred broadened access to VPPA claims for all but 
the most basic personally identifying information.  But if no such 
alternative privacy laws applied, the Supreme Court would be forced to 
decide the precise limit of information that is “personally identifiable” 
under the VPPA.  To set such a limitation, the Supreme Court would need 
access to significant resources and extensive knowledge regarding the 
information that may provide an individual’s identity.  Alternatively, 
should the Supreme Court not set strict requirements for “personally 
identifiable information,” plaintiffs in subsequent litigation would continue 
to attempt to extend the reaches of the VPPA. 
Overall, the Supreme Court would not have access to the same time, 
experts, and resources as Congressional committees to draft an outcome 
that would adequately resolve these issues.  As noted in section I above, 
forty-two percent of American households currently use video-streaming 
services.213  Thus, any drastic changes to the system of video distribution 
                                                          
212. Id. at 281.   
213. Todd Spangler, Streaming Overtakes Live TV among Consumer Viewing 
Preferences: Study, VARIETY (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:21 AM), 
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would affect a sizeable portion of the population.  Since the practice of 
collecting information in exchange for content has become commonplace, 
Congress should determine the threshold of information individuals are 
willing to trade for video services.  Instead of courts broadening the lines of 
privacy under the VPPA, deferring to Congress empowers the public to 
defend its privacy through representation in the political process.  To this 
end, the Supreme Court was entirely correct to deny certiorari in In re 
Nickelodeon.214 
V. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DRAFTING NEW LEGISLATION 
TO FURTHER AMEND & SUPPLEMENT THE VPPA 
Our decision necessarily leaves some unanswered questions about 
what kinds of disclosures violate the Video Privacy Protection Act.  Such 
uncertainty is ultimately a consequence of our common-law system of 
adjudication and the rapid evolution of contemporary technology.  
 –Judge Julio M. Fuentes215 
 
Congress could leave the VPPA static to govern the limited scope of 
the online equivalent of video rental subscription services.  To do so, 
Congress would first need to amend the VPPA to clearly define such 
subscription services and encourage a narrow interpretation of the Act.  
This approach would allow Congress to move forward and make key 
decisions regarding online privacy as a whole.  In fact, doing so is far from 
making the Act dead-letter law as the VPPA still governs pure subscription 
services that operate online.216  Instead, the current circumstance creates an 
opportunity for the legislature to mold the future of online privacy. 
In drafting new legislation, Congress should endeavor to provide 
sufficient clarity for video service providers of permitted online conduct 
while maintaining adequate flexibility to be adapted to future technological 
changes.  First, Congress would be wise to consider the issues outlined in 
the previous section and thoroughly address the motives underlying VPPA 
claims.  New legislation must be structured so as not to chill the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the online marketplace.  It must leave markets open 
                                                          
214. C. A. F. v. Viacom Inc., 827 F.3d 262, 262 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
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215. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 290 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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for small video makers, distributors, and websites to enter and generate 
income through advertising revenue.  Therefore, video service providers 
must be allowed to share some information to gain a profit from 
advertisement firms and data brokers.  To balance these interests, Congress 
should invite commentary from businesses operating in Internet 
distribution of online video content. 
As the subject matter of this legislation involves highly technical and 
specialized information, Congress must ensure that any protections of 
personal information are uniformly applied.  One means of accomplishing 
this goal would be to delineate categories of data and their level of 
attachment to individual identity as discussed in In re Nickelodeon.217  Such 
categories could establish a firm line on the number of steps or additional 
data necessary to unmask an individual to qualify as “personally 
identifiable information.”  This guidance would prove invaluable in 
ensuring uniform application in the future and avoid the current problems 
of the VPPA.   
Congress should also consider the broad nature of the practice of 
online information collecting.  For this purpose, future legislation could 
also address the source of the problem for the Yershov conundrum218—the 
collection of such data that can pinpoint an individual’s viewing habits and 
history.  As the Third Circuit decided in In re Nickelodeon, the VPPA 
merely permits claims against individuals that send data, not third parties 
who receive personally identifiable information with the ability or intent to 
discover an individual’s identity.219  New legislation could address this 
issue by barring such conduct.  However, this consideration will run up 
against legitimate interests in freedom of speech, i.e. the reporter that 
obtained Judge Bork’s information220 and thus any restrictions must be 
narrowly tailored if applied.  Therefore, it would be best to include a strict 
consent provision informing precisely what data is being combined.  Such a 
measure would allow personalized advertising to continue but provide an 
avenue for individuals to set its limits. 
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Alternatively, should Congress have issues outlining all-
encompassing regulation, a new statute could establish or appoint a 
governing body.  This body could give nonbinding suggestions regarding 
the types and nature of permitted practices to aid future interpretation by 
generalist judges.  Indeed, a governing body could provide much-needed 
relief for both individuals and video providers.  Instead of waiting for the 
courts to set the limits of the legislation, companies that believe they may 
have exposure to liability under new legislation have the comfort of 
consulting the body to clarify their concerns and address any potential 
issues.  Furthermore, the body would benefit individuals by providing a 
watchdog for online privacy instead of individuals having to rely solely on 
litigation.  Should Congress require a more direct approach, it could enable 
a governing body to directly control application to emerging technologies 
similar to that granted to the Federal Trade Commission under the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.221 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To some extent, of course, this exercise involves an attempt to place a 
square peg (modern electronic technology) into a round hole (a statute 
written in 1988 aimed principally at videotape rental services). 
–Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV222 
 
Since the VPPA’s enactment in 1988,223 the Act has protected 
individuals who wanted to watch videos without giving away their personal 
information to third parties.224  However, the disagreements between the 
First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits regarding the definitions of “subscriber” 
and “personally identifiable information” clearly illustrate a struggle to 
adapt the Act to current technology and usage during the Internet era.  As 
this Note has shown, it is not enough for courts to merely adopt a broad or 
narrow interpretation of the VPPA as these approaches will lead to either 
inconsistency in application by courts and the potential for nearly limitless 
liability for video service providers or under-protection of individuals’ 
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identities.  Furthermore, the current ambiguity regarding the reaches of the 
VPPA requires Internet video providers to navigate between the Scylla of 
bankruptcy and the Charybdis of unlimited liability. 
Indeed, Congress must create new guidelines to prevent the onslaught 
of case-by-case litigation that will arise when courts are inevitably asked to 
apply such legislation to unanticipated new technology.  While the 
principles underlying the VPPA protect individuals who engage in online 
activities,225 the VPPA itself lacks sufficient clarity.  Congress must act to 
adequately protect the interests of parties involved on all sides of the 
business of online video. 
However, with the necessity of legislative change comes the prospect 
of fixing the current system.  Although Congress created the VPPA using 
the form of similar acts in its time,226 it has a chance to set a new standard 
for Internet privacy in drafting a new act that both addresses the needs of 
the consumer and safeguards the financial needs of the online industry. 
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226. See 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (effective Oct. 26, 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012) 
(effective Nov. 2, 2002). 
